



















































Attribute	 Description	Source	IP	 The	IP	Address	of	the	source.	Destination	IP	 The	destination	IP	address	Packets	 Number	of	packets	in	flow	Octets	 Number	of	bytes	in	flow	Duration	 The	duration	of	flow	in	milliseconds	Source	Port	 Source	port	number	Destination	Port	 Destination	port	number	TCP	Flags	 Cumulative	OR	of	TCP	flags	Protocol	 The	transport	layer	protocol	such	6=TCP,	17=UDP	
Table	2.	Detail	of	IP	flows	in	Sperotto’s	dataset	
Alert	Type	 No.	of	IP	Flows	 Category	SSH	 13942629	 Malicious	FTP	 13	 Malicious	HTTP	 9798	 Malicious	AUTH-IDENT	 191339	 Side	effect	IRC	 7383	 Side	effect	OTHERS	 18970	 Side	effect	
Sperotto’s	dataset	The	Sperotto’s	dataset	consists	of	14.2M	IP	flow	records	collected	through	a	”Honeypot”	deployment	in	University	of	Twente	network	[22].	The	honeypot	was	directly	connected	to	internet	to	ensure	maximum	exposure	to	attacks.	Three	common	services	SSH,	HTTP	and	FTP	were	run	over	the	honeypot.	Information	about	the	flows	is	extracted	from	the	log	files	of	receptive	service.	Part	of	the	traffic	in	dataset	is	the	side	effect	of	alerts	and	is	not	considered	malicious.	During	the	flow	collection,	one	hacker	installed	an	IRC	proxy	over	the	honeypot.	The	traffic	generated	due	to	IRC	is	also	non-malicious.	The	alert	types	and	number	of	flows	corresponding	to	each	alert	type	are	shown	in	Table	2.	The	four	time	related	attributes	start-time	start-msec,	end-time	and	end-msec	in	the	original	dataset	are	computed	to	a	single	attribute	of	duration	in	milliseconds	[21].	Also	the	dataset	itself	do	not	contain	any	normal	traffic,	we	have	included	a	large	number	of	normal	flows	in	the	dataset.	The	normal	flows	have	been	collected	by	ourselves	from	a	medium-size	network	of	legitimate	users.	The	behavior	of	users	during	the	normal	flow	collection	period	include	browsing	web,	streaming	videos,	online	games	and	remote	server	access.	The	Sperotto’s	dataset	is	very	large,	therefore	we	have	extracted	a	subset	of	IP	flows	from	the	dataset.	Table	3	gives	detail	of	IP	flows	in	the	training	and	test	dataset.	The	training	dataset	contains	10,000	malicious	flows	and	500	normal	flows.	The	testing	dataset	consists	of	11740	malicious	and	124240	normal	IP	flows.	
Table	3.	Detail	of	IP	flow	records	in	Sperotto’s	dataset	
Training	dataset	 Testing	dataset	Malicious	 Normal	 Malicious	 Normal	10000	 500	 11740	 124240	
Table	4.	Detail	of	IP	flow	records	in	Malware	and	APT	dataset	
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Training	dataset	 Testing	dataset	Malicious	 Normal	 Malicious	 Normal	3524	 350	 5286	 124367	










Training	dataset	 Testing	dataset	Malicious	 Normal	 Malicious	 Normal	
	 2083	 300	 10423	 7901	
Table	7.	Confusion	Matrix	for	outlier	detection	during	one-class	SVM	training	Sperotto’s	dataset	
Classified	as	 Malicious	 Normal	(Outliers)	Malicious	 9161	 839	Normal	(Outliers)	 8	 492	
Table	8.	First	stage	detection	results	-	Sperotto’s	dataset	











Alert	Cluster	 Actual	IP	Flows	 IP	flows	in	attack	cluster	HTTP	IN	 2127	 2154	HTTP	OUT	 2113	 2085	SSH	IN	 4140	 3992	SSH	OUT	 3360	 4006	Other-I	 0	 770	Other-II	 0	 24	Total	 11740	 13031	
	











Classified	as	 Malicious	 Normal	(Outliers)	Malicious	 2857	 330	Normal	(Outliers)	 20	 667	
Table	11.	First	stage	detection	results	-	Malware	and	APT	dataset	
Recall	 Precision	 False	Positive	rate	 F1-Measure	0.9876	 0.9170	 0.017	 0.9507	
Malware	and	APT	Dataset	results	In	the	second	experiment,	we	have	used	malware	and	APT	flow-based	dataset	for	evaluation.	The	two-stage	intrusion	detection	model	is	trained	using	the	dataset	shown	in	Table	4.	The	enhanced	one-class	SVM	removes	the	normal	flows	from	the	training	dataset	leaving	only	the	malicious	flows.	Table	10	shows	the	confusion	matrix	for	outlier	detection	process	in	one-class	SVM	training.	The	one-class	SVM	successfully	removes	94.28%	normal	flows	from	the	training	dataset.	The	remaining	2857	IP	flows	are	used	by	the	one-class	SVM	and	SOM	for	learning	the	malicious	behavior	and	creation	of	attack	clusters.	The	trained	one-class	SVM	is	presented	with	a	test	dataset	of	129654	IP	flows.	It	classifies	5226	IP	flows	as	malicious	out	of	total	5286	IP	flows.	The	detected	malicious	flows	also	include	434	normal	flows	as	false	positives.	Table	11	shows	the	precision,	recall,	false	positive	rate	and	F1-score	values.	The	one-class	SVM	achieves	an	F1-measure	of	0.9507	and	successfully	detects	malicious	IP	flows.	The	results	again	show	that	one-class	SVM	is	suitable	for	detection	of	malicious	flows.	The	malicious	flows	detected	in	first	stage	are	forwarded	to	SOM	clustering	algorithm	in	second	stage	detection	process.	The	number	of	malicious	flows	is	5226	including	434	false	positives.	We	manually	set	the	number	of	attack	cluster	in	SOM	to	six	which	include	four	clusters	for	malware	and	APTs	and	two	additional	clusters	to	place	the	un-clustered	IP	flows.	The	SOM	places	the	malicious	IP	flows	into	closet	matching	attack	clusters.	The	clustering	results	and	the	actual	number	of	flows	in	every	cluster	are	given	in	Table	12.	1312	out	of	1669	flows	of	Sality	malware	are	placed	in	correct	cluster.	The	Asprox	attack	cluster	has	3649	flows	while	the	actual	number	of	flows	are	3336.	Some	IP	flows	of	Sality	malware	are	placed	into	Asprox	cluster	because	Asprox	malware	traffic	is	not	uniform.	The	false	positives	of	first	stage	detection	process	are	separated	into	Other-I	and	Other-II	clusters.	Figure	7	compares	the	result	of	clustering	with	actual	IP	flows.	
Table	12.	SOM	clustering	results	-	Malware	and	APT	dataset	
Alert	Cluster	 Actual	IP	Flows	 IP	flows	in	attack	cluster	Sality	outgoing	 1669	 1312	Asprox	outgoing	 3336	 3649	TBot	outgoing	 133	 200	Nuclear	outgoing	 88	 64	Other-I	 0	 2	
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Other-II	 0	 59	Total	 5286	 5226	
	
	 Sality	OUT	Asprox	OUT	TBot	OUT	Nuclear	OUT	 Other	I	 Other	II	
Fig	7.	Malware	and	APT	clustering	results	comparison	









Recall	 Precision	 FPR	 F1-Measure	0.9920	 0.9937	 0.00	 0.9928	





Table	16.	Comparison	of	results	with	other	approaches	Detection	stage	 Performance	measure	 [28]	(DARPA	dataset)	 [23]	(KDD99	dataset)	 Our	approach	Sperotto	dataset	 APT	 and	malware	dataset	
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